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The compensation structure of the securities business is being
challenged from many directions. The Justice Department has ques-
tioned the need for fixed minimums on stock exchange commissions
0 As noted in the opening paragraph, this area of regulation is in a period of rapid
change; the statements herein are current as of January 20, 1970.
A revised version of this article is expected to be included in a book on the regulation
of securities dealers, to be published by McGraw-Hill.
t Professor of Law, Cornell University. A.B. 1952, LL.B. 1955, Harvard University.
Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, 1966-68.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Peter Sterling, of the Cornell Law
School class of 1970, for his research assistance in the preparation of this article.
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and the Securities and Exchange Commission is holding extensive hear-
ings to determine whether and in what form they can be justified.
Congress is considering legislation to control sales loads on mutual
fund shares. The National Association of Securities Dealers found "un-
fair or unreasonable" underwriting compensation in more than fifteen
percent of the new issues it reviewed in 1968. And the securities busi-
ness itself is complaining that its charges on small transactions are in-
adequate to cover its costs.
The following summary of the complex of regulations governing
compensation in the securities business may help to explain some of
the dissatisfaction with the current situation, as well as pointing toward
possible areas for change.
I
SOURCES OF INCOME OF BROKER-DEALERS
The securities business is essentially a service business. Some of the
transactions in which broker-dealer firms engage take the form of
principal transactions, but basically such firms act as intermediaries
between buyers and sellers of securities-members of the public, insti-
tutional investors, and the issuers of the securities themselves. Broker-
dealers receive compensation from a variety of activities, each of which
is subject to distinct regulations and limitations. A study done for the
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) showed that its
members in 1964 obtained about forty-four percent of their income
from stock exchange commissions, seventeen percent from over-the-
counter transactions, eight percent from mutual fund sales activities,
six percent from corporate underwritings, and the remaining twenty-
five percent from miscellaneous other sources, including interest on
customers' margin accounts, commodity transactions, advisory fees,
and service charges.' The compensation mix varied greatly from firm
to firm, with the larger firms deriving a greater proportion of their
income from stock exchange commissions, the small-to-medium firms
deriving the greatest proportion from over-the-counter activities, and
the smallest firms receiving most of their income from the retailing of
mutual fund shares.2
1 Booz, ALLEN & HAMILTON, INC., OVER-THE-COUNTER MARKETS STUDY 13 (1966) [here-
inafter cited as OTC STUDY]. See also NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 1969 FACT BOOK 57.
2 OTC STUDY 13.
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II
STOCK EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS
A. Fixed Minimum Commission Rates
Commissions on stock exchange transactions are based on sched-
ules of minimum commissions established by the national securities
exchanges and binding on their members. The commission rate sched-
ules of the various exchanges are substantially identical, so that a firm
that is a member of several exchanges must charge the same commission
to a customer for a particular transaction regardless of on which ex-
change it is executed.3 Since New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) trans-
actions account for approximately eighty percent of the dollar volume
of all exchange trading,4 the following discussion is based on the NYSE
rules, with appropriate indications of variations to be found in the
rules of other exchanges.
1. Scope of Restriction
The stock exchange rules prescribe minimum commission rates,
and there is generally no legal restriction against members charging
higher rates. As a practical matter, however, member firms seldom
charge more than the minimum rate for services to which the rate
schedule applies.5
The commission rate schedule is divided into two distinct parts:
(1) a schedule of rates to be charged by members to non-members for
effecting a complete transaction on the exchange and (2) a schedule
3 The New York Stock Exchange [NYSE], American Stock Exchange [AMEX], Mid-
west Stock Exchange [MSE], and Pacific Coast Stock Exchange [PCSE] rules state that in
the event of a conflict as to commission rates to be charged, their members may follow
the rates prescribed by the exchange where the transaction occurred. NYSE CONST. art.
XV, § 1; AMEx CONST. art. Vi, § 1; MSE rules art. XXVIII, rule 19; PCSE rule IV, § 3(f).
A NYSE member which is also a member of a regional exchange (i.e., an exchange located
outside the City of New York) is permitted to deal in all securities listed or traded on
such other exchange, including securities dually listed on the NYSE. NYSE CONST. art.
XIV, § 8. The AMEX rules also permit member trading of dually-listed AMEX securi-
ties outside the City of New York. AMEx CONsr. art. V, § 4(g). The SEC found in 1941
that "irreparable damage" would result to the regional exchanges if the NYSE prevented
its members from dealing on another exchange in securities dealt in on the NYSE, and
ordered the NYSE constitution amended to permit such dealing. The Rules of the NYSE,
10 S.E.C. 270 (1941) (The Multiple Trading Case).
4 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239, at 4 n.2 (Jan. 26, 1968).
5 See generally ASSOCIATION OF STOCK EXCHANGE FamMs, COMMSION TABLEs FOR TRANs-
ACTIONS ON THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE AND THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE.
6 "Non-member" is usually defined as any party not a member or allied member of
an exchange, and includes professional brokers as well as ordinary customers. NYSE
CONST. art. I, § 3(e).
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of rates to be charged by members to one another for the various steps
involved in the complete transaction.
The minimum rate to be charged to non-members applies to all
non-members, including those engaged in the securities business. Since
the rules of the exchanges generally prohibit members from executing
transactions in listed stocks off the floor of an exchange, 7 this in effect
places a minimum on the commission that a member firm may charge
a non-member firm for effecting a transaction in a listed security.
2. Non-Member Rates
a. Services Covered. The minimum rate to be charged to a non-
member is an all-inclusive rate, covering the execution and clearance
of the transaction, arrangements for the registration and delivery of the
securities, and basic research and custodial services. The exchanges
generally impose restrictions, however, on the additional services that
a member firm may perform for a customer without charging addi-
tional fees,8 on the ground that these may constitute rebates of the
minimum commission.9
If both the buyer and seller are non-members, two full commis-
sions must be charged, even where the same firm acts as broker for
both parties to the transaction.
b. Basic Rate. The commission to be charged to a non-member
for the execution of a transaction in listed stocks, rights, or warrants
is based on the "money involved" in a "single transaction." On stocks
selling for one dollar per share and above, the basic rate is three dollars
plus
2% on first $400 of money involved, plus
1% on next $2,000 of money involved, plus
1/2% on next $2,600 of money involved, plus
1/10% on money involved above $5,000.10
Under this formula, the minimum commission for buying or sell-
7 See NYSE rules 394, 895, 396; AMEX rule 187; MSE rules art. XXII, rule 6; PCSE
rule XIII, § 2.
8 Examples of prohibited arrangements are unusual interest rates or money advances
or assumption of stamp taxes or office expenses by a member, NYSE rule 369; certain types
of statistical and investment advisory services, NYSE rule 440; supplementary material
and certain office space arrangements, NYSE rule 343. The regional exchange rules con-
tain similar prohibitions. AMEx CoNsT. art. VI, § 5; MSE rules art. XXVIII, rule 16;
PCSE CONsr. art. XIV, § 1.
9 See NYSE CONsT. art. XV, § 1.
10 NYSE CONST. art. XV, § 2(a)(1); AAmx CONsr. art. VI, § 2(a); MSE rules art.
XXVIII, rule 2(a); PCSE rule IV, § l(a)(1).
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ing one hundred shares of a high-priced stock is greater than the com-
mission for buying or selling one hundred shares of a low-priced stock
but is a smaller percentage of the "money involved." For example, the
minimum commission for buying or selling one hundred shares of
stock selling at $20 a share is $27, or 1.35 percent of the money in-
volved; for one hundred shares of a $40 stock, it is $39, or 0.98 percent
of the money involved; and for one hundred shares of an $80 stock,
it is $47, or 0.5 percent of the money involved.
Although this formula on its face appears to provide a substantially
lower rate for large transactions, each one hundred shares or less in-
cluded in an order is deemed to be a separate, "single transaction" to
which the formula is to be applied.1 Thus the minimum commission
on a single order to buy or sell 200 shares of a $40 stock is $78, or
two times $39, and on a single order to buy or sell 1,000 shares it is
$390, or ten times $39. A customer who wants to invest $4,000, there-
fore, must pay a commission of $54 if he buys 200 shares of a $20 stock
as against $39 if he buys one hundred shares of a $40 stock.
c. Lower Rate on Large Orders. Prior to December 5, 1968, the
above rate applied to all orders without limitation as to size, so that
the minimum commission on a single order to buy or sell 100,000
shares of a particular stock was 1,000 times the commission on one
hundred shares of the same stock. However, the volume of large block
transactions in listed stocks,'12 particularly by institutional investors,13
had been rapidly increasing, and the SEC's public hearing on stock
exchange commission rates disclosed that substantial portions of the
commissions on institutional business were being "given up" to
broker-dealer firms and other persons who had no connection with the
execution of the transactions.' 4 Consequently, the national securities
exchanges were required to put into effect on December 5, 1968, an
"interim" revised minimum commission rate schedule providing sub-
stantially lower rates for the portion of an order that exceeds 1,000
shares.' 5 The modified rate for each "single transaction" of one hundred
- shares or less after the first 1,000 shares is:
11 NYSE CONsr. art. XV, § 2(d)(1); AasEx CONSr. art. VI, § 2(f); MSE rules art.
XXVIII, rule 2(d)(1); PCSE rule IV, § 1(b).
12 In 1968 on the NYSE there were 11,254 transactions involving 10,000 or more
shares, accounting for 10% of reported volume. NYSE, 1968 ANN. REP. 15.
13 It is estimated that at present approximately 50% of non-member volume on the
NYSE is transacted by institutions. SEC, 1968 ANN. RE. 8.
14 See text accompanying notes 88-62 infra.
'5 NYSE CONsr. art. XV, § 2(a)(2); Assax CoNsr. art. VI, § 2(a)(2); MSE rules art.
XXVIII, rule 2(a)(2); PCSE rule IV, § l(a)(2). It was estimated that the new volume dis-
count on orders over 1,000 shares would reduce brokerage commissions about $150 million
in 1969. SEC, 1968 ANN. REP. 2.
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Money Involved Commission
$100 to $2,800 1/2% of money involved plus $4
$2,800 to $3,000 compute as for $2,800
$3,000 to $9,000 1/2% of money involved plus $3
Above $9,000 1/10% of money involved plus $39
Thus the minimum commission on a purchase or sale of 10,000 shares
of a $40 stock is now $2,460 [(10 X $39) + (90 X $23)] as compared
with $3,900 (100 X $39) under the previous formula. The interim rate
also provides that the minimum commission on any order, no matter
how large, cannot exceed $100,000.16
An "order" is deemed to include all purchases or sales for one
account, of a single security, on the same day, pursuant to a single
order.1 7 When a large order from a customer is executed over a period
of several days, each day's executions are considered a separate "order"
for the purpose of computing the minimum commission. Where parts
of a single order from a customer to a broker are executed on different
exchanges, the regional stock exchanges will permit the lower rate to
be charged on the portion in excess of 1,000 shares regardless of the
exchange on which executed.'
d. Odd Lots. The minimum commission on the purchase or sale
of less than one hundred shares' 9 is generally fixed at two dollars less
than the commission on a one hundred share transaction involving the
same amount of money. An odd-lot transaction is automatically ex-
ecuted between the customer and the odd-lot dealer at the price of
the next round-lot transaction in the stock. In addition to the commis-
sion charged by the customer's broker, the odd-lot dealer charges the
customer a "differential" of one-fourth point (25 cents) on stocks
selling at $55 or higher and one-eighth point (12.5 cents) on stocks sell-
ing below $55.20
10 NYSE CONsr. art. XV, § 2(0; A~mx CONsv. art. V1, § 2(h); MSE rules art. XXVIII,
rule 2(f); PCSE rule IV, § 1(d). One NYSE member advertised that it acted as broker
for both buyer and seller in a NYSE transaction on May 4, 1967, involving 585,600 shares
of Sperry Rand at a price of $30.75 a share. N.Y. Times, May 8, 1967, at 64. Under the
then-existing rates, the minimum commissions to be charged by the firm on that transac-
tion totaled $402,600. Under the new rate schedule, the minimum commissions would
total $200,000.
17 NYSE CONs?. art. XV, §§ 2(d)(2), (3); AmaEx CoNsT. art. VI, § 2(t)(2); MSE rules
art. XXVIII, rule 2(d)(w); PCSE rule IV, § 1(b)(2).
18 E.g., MSE rules art. XXVIII, rule 2(j).
19 For minimum rates on 100-share lots, see text accompanying notes 10-11 supra. A
"unit of trading" is usually 100 shares and any number below 100 is an odd lot. How-
ever, certain stocks have "units of trading" of 10 or even 50 shares as fixed by the various
exchanges. NYSE rule 55; AMEX rule 120; MSE rules art. IV, rule 6; PCSE rule 1, § 7(a).
20 NYSE rule 125. The present $55 "break point" was adopted by the NYSE in June
1966. Between 1942 and 1966, the "break point" was $40 and had been established not by
the Exchange but by the two NYSE member firms that handle all odd-lot transactions on
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e. Special Types of Securities and Transactions. Special rules
prescribe minimum commission rates for shares selling below one
dollar,2 1 for bonds,22 for "when issued" or "when distributed" trans-
actions,23 and other special circumstances.
3. Intra-Member Rates
Exchange rules also prescribe minimum commissions to be charged
by members to other members for various services in connection with
the execution of transactions. The minimum commissions for floor
brokerage and clearance range from 1.85 cents a share for shares selling
between one dollar and two dollars to 9.30 cents a share for shares
selling at $200 and above;24 minimum commissions for floor brokerage
alone range from 1.15 cents a share for shares selling between one
dollar and two dollars to 4.65 cents a share for shares selling at $200
and above;2 5 and minimum clearing charges range from 0.30 cents a
share for shares selling between fifty cents and one dollar to 3.00 cents
a share for shares selling at $50 and above.26
B. Rates and Services to Non-Member Professionals
The NYSE rules prohibit member firms from charging lower com-
missions to non-member broker-dealers than to other customers, and the
rules endeavor to set precise limitations on the services member firms
may perform free or at less than cost for non-member professionals. 27
For example, there are specific limitations on the furnishing of office
space, investment advice, and private wire services, as well as a general
that Exchange. A class action is presently pending against those two firms, alleging that
they combined and conspired to monopolize odd-lot trading and fixed the odd-lot dif-
ferential at an excessive amount in violation of the Sherman Act. Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). The "break point" on AMEX transactions is still
$40. For the rules on other exchanges, see AMEX rule 204; MSE Summary of Rules, § 14;
PCSE rule 1, § 8.
21 NYSE CONsr. art. XV, § 2(a)(3); AMEx CONST. art. VI, § 2(a)(3); MSE rules art.
XXVIII, rule 2(c)(2); PCSE rule IV, § 1(a)(3).
22 NYSE CONST. art. XV, § 3; Asmxx CONsr. art. VI, § 2(d); MSE rules art. XXVIII,
rule 3; PCSE rule IV, § 1(f.
23 NYSE CONsr. art. XV, § 5; AmEx CONST. art. VI, § 2(i); MSE rules art. XXVIII,
rule 5.
24 NYSE CONsT. art. XV, § 2(b)(1); AiEx CoNSr. art. VI, § 2(b); MSE rules art.
XXVIII, rules 2(b), (c)(1); PCSE rule IV, § 4(a).
25 NYSE CONsr. art. XV, § 2(b)(3); AM=x CoNsr. art. VI, § 2(b); MSE rules art.
XXVIII, rule 2(c)(1); PCSE rule IV, § 4(b).
26 NYSE CONST. art. XV, § 4; AmEx CONsT. art. VI, § 2(b); MSE rules art. XXVIII,
rule 2(b); PCSE rule IV, § 4(a). NYSE interpretation permits member firms to charge cor-
respondents not less than 21% of the non-member rate rather than computing the special
rate for each transaction.
27 See NYSE CONST. art. I, § 3(e); id. art. XV, § 1.
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prohibition against offering other types of services unless the cash com-
pensation is sufficient to cover all direct and indirect costs of the service
or unless the service is contingent on the non-member giving the mem-
ber firm commission business and the cash charge covers all costs of
creating, producing, and distributing the service.28
1. Reciprocal Business Arrangements
Since these rules effectively prevent NYSE non-members from
deriving direct compensation from transactions in listed securities
which are executed for their customers on the NYSE,29 reciprocal
dealing arrangements have been established between NYSE-member
and regional exchange-member firms. The NYSE-member firm, which
is also a member of a regional exchange, usually agrees to give one
dollar of commission to the regional exchange-member firm for each
two dollars in commissions on transactions in listed securities it re-
ceives from the latter.80 Prior to December 5, 1968, reciprocity often
took the form of the NYSE-member firm executing transactions in
dually-listed securities on a regional exchange of which it was also a
member, and "giving up" a portion of the commission to the regional
firm.81 Since the prohibition on "give-ups," 32 reciprocity has taken the
form of NYSE members placing orders with regional exchange mem-
bers for execution of transactions in dually-listed stocks on the regional
exchanges.33 In May 1969, however, the NYSE advised the SEC that
some of these reciprocal arrangements appeared to violate the NYSE
rules against rebates and that it was considering prohibiting reciprocal
arrangements.34
2. Discounts
The NYSE recently announced that it is considering a rule change
permitting its members to give a discount, amounting to perhaps one-
28 See note 8 supra.
29 The non-member must pay the member the NYSE minimum commission and
will usually receive no more than the minimum commission from his own customer.
3o These arrangements in 1968 resulted in the NYSE giving out $19.9 million in
regional business in return for $34.4 million in NYSE business. Wall St. J., June 10, 1969,
at 4, col. 1.
31 Wall St. J., July 3, 1968, at 17, col. 3.
32 NYSE CONST. art. XV, § 1; Amasx CONST. art. VI, § 1; MSE rules art. XXVIII, rule
12; PCSE rule IV, § 1(a). See text accompanying notes 38-62 infra.
33 Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1969, at 1, col. 6. See also note 54 infra and accompanying text.
34 Wall St. J., May 5, 1969, at 6, col. 2. NYSE rule 282 requires a member to file
written information concerning any direct or indirect reciprocal arrangement related to
NYSE listed commission business involving any NYSE member, broker or dealer, bank,
trust company, mutual fund, etc. Each arrangement is subject to Exchange approval.
1970]
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third of the commission, to "qualified" non-member broker-dealers. 8
The American Stock Exchange (AMEX) already admits qualified
broker-dealers to "associate membership" entitling them to have trans-
actions executed on the AMEX at special intra-member rates that
range from about twenty percent to one hundred percent above the
rates charged to regular members for comparable services86 but are
considerably below the rates charged to non-members. For example,
the commission charged to an associate member for execution and
clearance of one hundred shares of a $20 stock is $10.75, as compared
with $6.90 to a regular member and $27 to a non-member. The ini-
tiation fee for an associate member is five percent of the last sale price
of a regular membership, but not less than $1,000. 37
C. Recent Developments Regarding Commission Rates
1. Institutional Investors and the Growth of "Give-Ups"
Prior to December 5, 1968, the minimum commissions on large
transactions were simply multiples of the minimum commissions for
one-hundred-share transactions. 88 During the 1960's, the rapidly grow-
ing participation in the stock market by institutions and the con-
comitant increase in large block trading began to provide stock ex-
change member firms with commissions substantially in excess of the
prices at which they would have been willing to execute the trans-
actions in a competitive service market. Exchange rules prohibited
member firms from reducing their rates to large customers or pro-
viding offsetting services,39 but nothing prevented member firms from
sharing their commissions with other member firms. Managers of
certain large institutional investors, particularly the mutual funds,
began to direct brokers to "give up" a portion of their commissions
on fund portfolio transactions to other member firms.40 These other
member firms might be firms that had provided the fund with invest-
ment advice or, to an increasing extent, firms that had actively sold
35 Wall St. J., June 10, 1969, at 4, col. 1.
86 AMEX CONsr. art. IV, § 1(c).
87 Id. art. VI, § 2(b). The Pacific Coast Stock Exchange grants "preferred rates" (75%
of the non-member minimum) to approved non-members who are members of a national
securities exchange or national securities association, or who are engaged in the banking
business. PCSE rule IV, § 2. A list of approved non-members is published by the Exchange.
38 See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
39 See notes 9 & 27 supra.
40 The give-ups were usually at least 60%, and often 70% or more, of the commis-
sion received by the broker. SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY
GROWTH, published as H.R. RE. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 170 (1966) [hereinafter dted
as MUTUAL FUND REPORT].
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the fund's shares.4 ' Initially the technique could be used only to com-
pensate stock exchange member firms for sales of mutual fund shares,
but, commencing in 1950, six of the seven regional exchanges amended
their rules to permit members to "give up" part of their commissions
to any member of the NASD. These amendments caused a substantial
amount of business in dually-listed stocks to be diverted to the regional
exchanges for the purpose of compensating non-member broker-dealers
for mutual fund sales. 42 The NYSE did not permit its members to
split commissions with non-NYSE members on NYSE transactions, 43
but evidence introduced at the SEC hearing on stock exchange com-
mission rates indicated that some member firms had channeled dollars
to non-members by crediting them with arbitrary amounts on un-
related transactions in over-the-counter securities.44
In 1965 two of the largest investment advisers, which distributed
fund shares largely through their own organizations and therefore
had no incentive to utilize brokerage commissions to reward dealers
who sold fund shares, established broker-dealer subsidiaries that were
admitted to membership on the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange (PCSE).
These firms executed some transactions for the funds on the PCSE,
but their principal purpose was to receive reciprocal business and give-
ups from firms that executed transactions for the funds on other ex-
changes, principally the NYSE. All of the net profit from this oper-
ation, in one case, and approximately half of the net profit, in the other
case, was returned to the funds in the form of reduction in the man-
agement fee paid to the adviser.45
2. The NYSE Proposal and the SEC Response
In January 1968 the NYSE proposed to the SEC a five-point revi-
sion in its commission rate structure. The proposal envisioned un-
specified volume discounts, continuation of customer-directed give-ups
with a limitation on the percentage that might be given up, prohibition
of "rebative" reciprocal practices, discounts for "qualified" non-mem-
ber broker-dealers, and limitation of membership and discounts on all
exchanges to "bona fide broker-dealers." 46 The SEC responded by in-
viting public comment on the NYSE proposals and on a proposed SEC
rule that prohibited mutual fund managers from directing any give-up
41 Id. at 164-67.
42 Id. at 171.
43 NYSE CONsr. art. xv, § 8.
44 See Washington Post, July 2, 1968, at D6, col. 1.
45 MuTuAL FuND REPoRT 109, 172.
46 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 (Jan. 26, 1968).
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of commissions on mutual fund portfolio transactions unless the bene-
fits of the give-up accrued to the fund and its shareholders.47
Among the comments received by the SEC was a lengthy memo-
randum from the Department of Justice, which concluded that "the
maintaining of an effective auction market, does not appear to justify
the fixing of minimum commission rates by the NYSE" and that "rate
fixing is plainly unnecessary in institutional trading and, generally,
for large transactions. '48 On May 28, 1968, the SEC requested the
NYSE, pursuant to section 19(b) of the Exchange Act, to adopt as an
interim measure either a specified revised commission rate schedule
providing reduced rates for the portion of any order in excess of 400
shares or a rule eliminating minimum rates of commission on orders
in excess of $50,000.4° At the same time, the SEC announced that it was
ordering a general public investigatory hearing into the commission
rate structure of the national securities exchanges.50
On August 8, 1968, the NYSE proposed an alternative interim
rate, providing reduced rates for that portion of any order in excess
of 1,000 shares. 51 On August 30 the SEC accepted the NYSE revision,52
which, after approval by the NYSE membership, went into effect on
December 5, 1968. 53 The regional exchanges each adopted substantially
identical rate structures. At the same time, each of the exchanges
amended its constitution or rules to prohibit give-ups by providing that
[n]o member ... shall, in consideration of the receipt of business...
and at the direct or indirect request of a non-member or by direct
or indirect arrangement with a non-member, make any payment
or give up any work or give up all or any part of any commission
or other property to which such member... is or will be entitled.54
3. The Public Hearing on Commission Rates
The SEC is continuing its public hearing into the commission
rate structure. The principal alternatives under consideration for
dealing with the problem of commission rates on large transactions
are: (1) continuation of minimum commissions, either in the present or
47 Id.
48 Comments of the United States Dep't of Justice on SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 8239 (Jan. 26, 1968).
49 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8324 (May 28, 1968).
50 Id.
51 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 77,585 (1968).
52 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8399 (Sept. 4, 1968).
53 For description of the revised rate schedule, see text accompanying notes 12-18
supra.
84 See, e.g., NYSE CONsT. art. xv. § 1; Aisx Co~sr. art. VI, § 1.
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a modified form; (2) elimination of minimum commissions on large
transactions; and (3) expanding large investors' opportunity to recap-
ture a portion of their brokerage costs through membership on ex-
changes. The NYSE has consistently opposed eliminating minimum
commissions on large transactions, on the ground that "[n]egotiated
commission rates would minimize the incentive for members to con-
duct business primarily on the floor of the NYSE . . . [and] would
divert trading into new and splintered over-the-counter markets."55
The Justice Department and a number of economists, on the other
hand, argue that fixing minimum rates in the securities industry is
not only unnecessary,56 but presents peculiar difficulties because of the
great variations in size, efficiency, and product mix of brokerage firms. 57
The NYSE also opposes institutional membership, 58 which many
brokers believe would deprive them of their best customers. Its an-
nounced reason is that "[g]ranted seats on the exchange, the insti-
tutions might soak up funds normally invested by individuals and
sharply cut the small lot trading that provides the market's liquidity."59
Managers of some investment institutions, on the other hand, believe
they should be entitled to join exchanges, at least to the extent of
enabling them to obtain the lower commission rates available to mem-
bers.60
The NYSE has announced that it hopes to submit a new rate
schedule to the SEC early in 1970.61 In the meantime, however, the
SEC has invited argument on the question whether, if minimum com-
mission rates are to be retained, they should continue to fix an "all-
inclusive" rate for non-members or should be limited to "such
relatively standardized services as 'execution' and 'clearance,'" as in
the case of intra-member rates.62
55 NYSE, ECONOMIC EFFE TS OF NEGOTIATED COMMISSION RATES ON THE BROKERAGE
INDusrRy, THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE SECURITIES, AND TIM INVESTING PUBLIC 11 (1968).
56 N.Y. Times, May 2, 1969, at 59, col. 1.
57 Memorandum of the United States Dep't of Justice on the Fixed Minimum Com-
mission Rate Structure 99-106 (Jan. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Justice Dep't Memo].
58 N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1969, at 67, col. 1. See also id., May 3, 1969, at 47, col. 8. The
Justice Department's Antitrust Division has recently challenged the NYSE position that
restrictions on public ownership of member firm shares should exist to prevent institu-
tional investors from gaining membership on the exchange. Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1969, at
3, col. 2.
59 Wall St. J., Jan. 23, 1969, at 3, col. 2.
60 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1969, at 73, col. 3.
61 NYSE Special Membership Bull., in BNA, SEC. REG. & L. REP., No. 26, at x-3 (Nov.
26, 1969).
62 SEC Securities 'Exchange Act Release No. 8791 (Dec. 31, 1969).
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D. Rates and Services to Small Customers
The same rigid structure which makes large transactions highly
profitable produces, at the other end of the scale, commissions on small
transactions which many brokers assert are insufficient to cover the
costs of handling them. There is no legal prohibition against charging
more than the minimum commission rates on exchange transactions,
but individual brokers are unwilling to do S0.63
Brokers and exchange officials have suggested modifications in the
commission rate structure to deal with this problem, either increasing
the minimum charge, or the "single transaction" charge, or imposing
separate charges for the maintenance of an account or for specific
services such as safeguarding customers' securities.6 4 Pending such
action, many brokerage houses have imposed minimum requirements
for purchases by new customers. A survey by the NYSE in May 1969
showed that fourteen percent of the 514 firms responding required
a new customer to make a minimum purchase ranging from $1,500 to
$250,000; fifteen percent required a minimum purchase of $1,000, and
five percent had minimums ranging from $100 to $500.65 No statute
or exchange rule requires brokers to accept small customers, but ex-
change officials consider rejecting small accounts inconsistent with
their policy of interesting small investors in the securities market.66
The President of the NYSE has stated, however, that "one of the key
changes in the commission structure [to be submitted to the SEC in
early 1970] must be an increase in rates on small orders. 67
E. Setting of Minimum Commission Rates
1. Action by the Exchanges
Since trading on the NYSE accounts for the great majority of
stock exchange commission business,68 and since the membership of
63 N.Y. Times, May 3, 1969, at 47, col. 8.
64 Wall St. J., April 11, 1969, at 3, col. 2.
65 Wall St. J., June 6, 1969, at 4, col. 4. More recently, several firms doing a large
retail business have changed their method of compensating salesmen to make it less attrac-
tive for them to solicit small orders. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1969, at 77, col. 6; id. Dec.
16, 1969, at 67, col. 7.
66 Ralph S. Saul, president of the AMEX, stated that a continuing rejection of smaller
public transactions "could lead to further domination of the market by institutions-
mutual funds, commercial banks, insurance companies and pension funds-with a cor-
responding loss of market liquidity." Wall St. J., April 11, 1969, at 3, col. 2.
67 Address of Robert Haack, in BNA SEc. REG. & L. RaP. No. 26, at x-1 (Nov. 26, 1969).
68 See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
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the NYSE overlaps that of the other exchanges to a large degree, the
NYSE commission rate structure determines the pattern for the in-
dustry.
a. Procedure. The NYSE's basic commission rate structure is set
forth in article XV of its constitution. Amendments to the constitution
must be approved by a majority of the Board of Governors and by a
majority of the members. 69 Since the product mix of NYSE members
varies greatly from firm to firm, any change in the commission rate
structure, other than an increase in the general level of rates, will be
opposed by some group of members.70 Each of the five changes in com-
mission rates between 1934 and 1967 was recommended by a special
committee of the NYSE and primarily involved an increase in the gen-
eral level of rates, although limited structural changes were involved
in some instances.71
b. Standards. The emphasis in the NYSE committee reports
preceding the five rate increases was on the income received from
commission business, the cost of doing such business, and the necessity
for a "fair return." 72 The NYSE's ability to develop precise standards
has been hampered by the heterogeneity of the member firms, the
absence of a mandatory uniform system of accounts, and limited capac-
ity to gather economic information.7 3
2. Review by the SEC
a. Procedure. Under section 19(b)(9) of the Exchange Act, the
SEC is authorized to alter or supplement the rules of any exchange "in
respect of ... the fixing of reasonable rates of commission" if "after
appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing, the Commission deter-
mines . . . that such changes are necessary or appropriate for the
protection of investors or to insure fair dealing in securities traded
in upon such exchange or to insure fair administration of such ex-
change." Before altering or supplementing exchange rules, the SEC
must first request the exchange to effect such changes itself.
The SEC has never exercised its authority under this section to
69 NYSE CoNsT. art. XX. On the MSE and PCSE the Board of Governors has authority
to set and change rates, and no amendment to the constitution or approval by the mem-
bership is necessary. PCSE CONsT. art. XIV, § 1; MSE CONsT. art. XII, § 2. The AMEX
follows the NYSE pattern. AMEx CONST. art. XII.
70 See Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1968, at 34, col. 1; id. Jan. 23, 1969, at 2, col. 3.
71 REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITmS MAR.ETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 2, at 329 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIL STUDY].
72 Id. at 333-37.
73 Id. at 337-43.
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alter or supplement exchange rules governing commission rates.74 The
1968 change in commission rates for large orders 75 was the first change
resulting from a formal request by the SEC under section 19(b)(9), 76
although rate increases put into effect by the NYSE in 1942 and 1958
were modified in accordance with "recommendations" or "suggestions"
by the SEC.77
Section 19(b) does not set forth any procedure for automatic SEC
review of rule changes instituted by the exchange. In each of the four
changes in commission rates between 1937 and 1953, the NYSE pre-
sented its proposals to the SEC and awaited the SEC's approval, or
indication of lack of objection, before making any effort to put the rule
changes into effect.78 In 1958, however, the NYSE notified the SEC
of proposed changes and eight days later submitted the proposed
schedule to the membership for approval, without waiting for SEC
reaction. The membership approved the rates, and they went into
effect seven weeks after the notification to the SEC, despite the SEC's
announcement of its intention to study their reasonableness. 79 The SEC
completed its study several months later. The ensuing discussions
resulted in the acceptance by the NYSE, in February 1959, of SEC sug-
gestions to decrease certain commission rates at the lower range of the
scale by approximately five percent and to eliminate the "round turn"
discount adopted in 1953.80
In light of the 1958 experience, the Special Study recommended
that "existing procedures should be modified to assure that proposed
changes in rates will be submitted to the Commission adequately in
advance of their proposed effectiveness." 8' Pursuant to this suggestion,
the SEC in 1964 adopted rule 17a-8, requiring every exchange to file
a report of any proposed rule change at least three weeks before any
action is taken by the members or governing body of the exchange.8 2
•4 The only case in which such authority has been exercised was The Rules of the
NYSE, 10 S.E.C. 270 (1941), described in note 3 supra.
75 See text accompanying notes 12-18 supra.
76 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8324 (May 28, 1968).
77 SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 330, 331, 344.
78 Id. at 344.
79 Id. at 345.
80 Id. at 332.
81 Id. at 351.
82 The adoption of rule 17a-8 was proposed early in 1964. SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 7218 (Jan. 9, 1964). It became effective April 6, 1964. SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 7253 (March 3, 1964).
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If any substantive change is made in the proposal, it starts a new three-
week period. s3
b. Standards. Section 19(b) provides that the SEC may require
such rule changes as "are necessary or appropriate for the protection
of investors or to insure fair dealing in securities traded in upon such
exchange or to insure fair administration of such exchange." Section
19(b)(9) refers to the "fixing of reasonable rates of commission,""4 but
the Special Study noted the absence of any "comprehensive and con-
sistent public articulation, on the part of the Exchange or the Com-
mission, of the principles or criteria to be applied in interpreting the
standard."8 5 One can hope that the public hearing on the commission
rate structure commenced in July 1968 will produce at least an at-
tempt by the SEC to articulate these principles and criteria.
A related problem noted by the Special Study is the inadequacy of
the data available to the SEC concerning the economics of the securities
business.8s Prior to 1968, the only information regularly available to
the SEC was that voluntarily supplied by the NYSE on the basis of the
income and expense reports submitted by its members. The Special
Study found that despite improvements over the years, these reports
failed to supply the data necessary to enable the SEC to discharge
effectively its statutory obligation to review the "reasonableness" of
commission rates.8 7
In June 1968 the SEC adopted a new rule 17a-10, requiring every
registered broker-dealer carrying public customer accounts to file an-
83 The Special Study also recommended consideration of the feasibility of providing
for a refund or adjustment of any portion of a rate increase which is put into effect by
an exchange and subsequently disapproved by the SEC. SPEcIAL STuay, pt. 2, at 351. No
specific action has yet been taken by the SEC to implement this proposal.
With respect to the possible liability of an exchange and its members under the
antitrust laws for rates established by an exchange and subsequently disapproved by the
SEC on the ground that they are not "reasonable," see Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American
President Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In the Sabre case, involving the
fixing of rates by a shipping conference, the court held, on a motion to dismiss, that the
defendants enjoyed no immunity from antitrust laws notwithstanding a pending Federal
Maritime Commission review of revised conference rates:
The mere fact that agreements setting rates are permitted to take effect prior to
approval, does not mean that irrespective of their effect on the commerce of the
United States they may be enjoyed until the defendants are caught, only to be
released from all past liability simply by discontinuing those rates.
Id. at 955. See also text accompanying notes 90-112 infra.
84 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(9) (1964) (emphasis added).
85 SPEC AL STUDy, pt. 2, at 343.
86 Id. at 342.
87 Id. at 342, 343.
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nual income and expense reports with the SEC or with either the
NASD or a national securities exchange, which will transmit the re-
ports to the SEC. 8 A report must be made for each calendar year, start-
ing with 1969, and is due ninety days after the end of the year. As a
result of industry opposition to providing the SEC with specific in-
formation about individual firms, the rule provides that, in forwarding
copies of the reports filed by their members to the SEC, the exchanges
and the NASD may omit the names and addresses of the members for
whom the reports are transmitted.
The rule requires the filing of one of three alternative forms. The
most comprehensive form is to be filed by firms that are members of
the NYSE or have gross securities income of $1,000,000 or more during
the year. An intermediate form is to be filed by non-members of the
NYSE who have gross securities income between $100,000 and $1,-
000,000. The simplest form is to be filed by non-members of the NYSE
who have gross securities income between $20,000 and $100,000 or
have gross securities income of $20,000 or more and derived more than
eighty percent of such income from retail mutual fund sales, municipal
bonds, fractional interests in oil, gas or other mineral rights, variable
annuities, savings and loan placements, real estate syndications, or any
combination of these. Firms that have gross securities income of less
than $20,000, that effect transactions only for other brokers or dealers,
or that are engaged only in wholesale distribution of mutual fund
shares or variable annuities are required to file only an introductory
page containing very limited information. The new reports are de-
signed "to provide needed comprehensive financial data on a continuing
basis so that up-to-date information will be readily available to the SEC,
the exchanges, and the NASD in connection with the performance of
their respective responsibilities." "
3. Antitrust Questions
The fixing of minimum commission rates by agreement among
the members of an exchange would clearly violate section 1 of the
Sherman Act as an agreement among competitors to restrain price
competition, unless an exemption is available. In Silver v. New York
Stock Exchange,90 decided in 1963, the Supreme Court held that
The Securities Exchange Act contains no express exemption
from the antitrust laws .... This means that any repealer of the
88 Proposed, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8242 (Feb. 1, 1968); adopted,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8347 (June 28, 1968).
89 Id.
90 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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antitrust laws must be discerned as a matter of implication, and
"[flit is a cardinal principle of construction that repeals by impli-
cation are not favored." . . . Repeal is to be regarded as implied
only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and
even then only to the minimum extent necessary.91
The Silver case did not involve the NYSE's power to adopt rules fixing
minimum rates of commissions, but rather its action in instructing its
members to discontinue their wire connections with the plaintiff, a
non-member firm.
In Kaplan v. Lehman Brothers2 shareholders in five mutual funds
sued the NYSE and four of its member firms, which had acted as brokers
for the funds, to recover treble damages based on the difference between
the commissions charged to the funds under the NYSE rules and the
rates that would have been available to the funds "by the operation
of free and open competition." 93 Plaintiffs took the position that pre-
scribed minimum rates can never be reasonable and that the fixing of
minimum rates through the collective action of NYSE members is
therefore illegal per se under the Sherman Act.94 On the issue of per se
illegality, the district court held that if the NYSE action was within
the authority conferred on the Exchange by the 1934 Act, plaintiffs'
position was inconsistent with the Silver decision. The court entered
summary judgment for defendants. On appeal to the Seventh Circuit,
the SEC filed an amicus curiae brief95 that urged three points: (1)
"Collective action by the Exchange and its members in establishing com-
mission rate rules is specifically contemplated under the Securities Ex-
change Act and thus does not constitute a per se violation of the
antitrust laws;"96 (2) the possible unreasonableness of existing min-
imum commission rates should not give rise to a cause of action under
the antitrust laws;97 and (3) an exchange should be exempt from anti-
trust liability when
(1) the allegedly illegal conduct is strictly pursuant to an exchange
rule promulgated in the course of self-regulatory duties and con-
sistent with traditional concepts of fair and orderly procedures;
(2) the exchange rule was filed with Commission; (3) the particular
91 Id. at 357.
92 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ill. 1966), aff'd, 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 954 (1967).
93 250 F. Supp. at 563.
94 Id. at 564.
95 Brief for Securities & Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae, Kaplan v. Lehman
Bros., 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1967).
96 Id. at 11.
97 Id. at 20.
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rule in question was subject to the Commission's oversight and
authority under Section 19(b) or other sections of the Exchange
Act, and within the area in which Congress contemplated that the
exchanges would act, unless and until otherwise determined by the
Commission; and (4) the rule is applied in a fundamentally fair
manner consistent with the purposes and goals of the Exchange
Act.98
The court of appeals affirmed in a two-page opinion which went beyond
the position taken by either the district court or the SEC. It "in-
terpreted" the district court's action "as holding that the antitrust laws
are inapplicable to the New York Stock Exchange insofar as its prescrib-
ing of minimum commission rates is concerned," and held that
[o]n the facts set forth in the complaint herein, we do not construe
the Sherman act and the exchange act as showing a congressional
intention to permit the maintenance of an antitrust prosecution
of the exchange or its members to be based upon its action relating
to rates of commission to be charged by its members.99
The Supreme Court denied certiorari, over the dissent of Chief Justice
Warren who argued that the "blunderbuss approach" of the Seventh
Circuit "falls far short of the close analysis and delicate weighing
process mandated by this Court's opinion in Silver."'00
On July 1, 1968, the SEC conuenced a public hearing into the
commission rate structure of the national securities exchanges. 10 1 The
memorandum that the NYSE submitted in August 1968102 argues, on
the basis of legislative history, not only that the antitrust laws are in-
applicable to the fixing of minimum commission rates by exchanges,
but that the SEC has no power under the Exchange Act "to prevent
the exchanges from fixing commission rates or to abolish exchange
rules which do so."'1 3 The NYSE further contends that elimination
98 Id. at 32-33 (footnote omitted).
99 371 F.2d at 411. Cf. Thill Securities Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange, 38 U.S.L.W.
2138 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 21, 1969), where the court held that the NYSE prohibition against
members sharing commissions with non-members did not constitute a per se violation of
the antitrust laws and that it would be inappropriate for the court to inquire into the
reasonableness of the prohibition in light of the SEC's current hearings on stock exchange
commission rates.
100 389 U.S. 954, 957 (1967) (dissenting opinion). Neither the SEC nor the Justice
Department took a position on the granting of certiorari.
101 See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8324 (May 28, 1968).
102 Memorandum on Behalf of the New York Stock Exchange on Commission Rate
Structure of Registered National Securities Exchanges, August 1968.
103 Id. at 7. But see SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8324 (May 28, 1968),
requesting the NYSE, pursuant to § 19(b) of the Exchange Act, either to adopt specified
revised minimum commission rates or to eliminate minimum rates with respect to orders
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of fixed minimum commissions would "undermine" the regulatory
role of exchanges,'04 "result in destructive competition,"'01 5 and "result
in rate discriminations, unrelated to volume discounts or cost savings,
in favor of large investors."'106
The Justice Department responded in January 1969 with a 200-
page memorandum. 107 It contends that "the system of fixed minimum
commissions is not justified or needed 'to make the Securities Exchange
Act work,' "108 and that the "historical context is utterly inconsistent
with any inference that Congress intended to ratify the then existing
rate structure or other practices."'109 The memorandum concludes that
the SEC "has the duty to effect the reconciliation of the antitrust laws
and the Securities Exchange Act outlined in the Silver case," and "has
the power, and indeed the duty, to abolish commission rate fixing on
registered national securities exchanges except to the extent that it
can be shown that such price fixing is necessary to achieve the purposes
of the Act."110 The Justice Department also argues that elimination
of fixed minimum commission rates would "strengthen the NYSE mar-
above $50,000. In its reply, the NYSE indicated that it considered both alternatives, but
felt that it was in the public interest to maintain minimum rates of commission. Letter
from NYSE to SEC, Aug. 8, 1968.
101 NYSE Memorandum, supra note 102, at 18.
105 Id. at 20.
106 Id. at 24.
107 Justice Dep't Memo, supra note 57.
108 Id. at 13.
109 Id. at 21.
110 Id. at 18. See FMC v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 590 U.S. 238 (1968), in-
volving shipping conference rules that prohibited travel agents from selling passage across
the Atlantic on non-conference lines and required unanimous action by conference members
before the maximum commission rates payable to travel agents could be changed. The
Federal Maritime Commission, in disapproving the agreements as "contrary to the public
interest," stated that "conference restraints that interfere with the policies of antitrust
laws will be approved only if . . . necessary to secure important public benefits or in
furtherance of a valid regulatory purpose of the Shipping Act." It placed the burden of
proof on the steamship lines to establish these legitimate objectives and justify the re-
straints. The steamship lines argued that the FMC antitrust test was not a permissible
elaboration of the "public interest" standard since "the whole purpose of the statutory
scheme would be defeated if incompatibility with the antitrust laws can be a sufficient
reason for denying immunity from these laws." The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed
the FMC's decision, holding that
once an antitrust violation is established, this alone wil normally constitute sub-
stantial evidence that the agreement is "contrary to the public interest," unless
other evidence in the record fairly detracts from the weight of this factor....
[Thus] the antitrust test formulated by the Commission is an appropriate refine-
ment of the statutory "public interest" standard.
Id. at 245-46. See Note, Antitrust and the Securities Industry: Lessons from the Shipping
Industry, 55 CoRNr.LL L. Ry. 96 (1969).
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ket,"111 and recommends that the SEC eliminate fixed minimum com-
mission rates over a five-year period, commencing with the elimina-
tion of fixed minimums on transactions over $50,000 and reducing that
figure by $10,000 each year. 112
III
OVER-THE-COUNTER TRANSArIMONS
In contrast to stock exchange transactions, no minimum commis-
sion rates are applicable to transactions in the over-the-counter (OTC)
market. The Exchange Act specifically provides that a national securi-
ties association, such as the NASD, may not adopt rules designed "to
fix minimum profits, to impose any schedule of prices, or to impose
any schedule or fix minimum rates of commissions, allowances, dis-
counts, or other charges." On the other hand, the rules of such an
association must be designed "to provide safeguards against unrea-
sonable profits or unreasonable rates of commissions or other charges. '13
The rules governing compensation for transactions in the OTC
market are complicated by the broker-dealer's ability, in many trans-
actions, to choose whether to act as agent or principal. If the broker-
dealer maintains an inventory in the particular security, he will
normally sell to his customer from that inventory as principal. If he
must obtain the security from another dealer, he may either buy for
his customer as agent and charge a commission or buy as principal and
resell to the customer at a mark-up.
An SEC sampling of sales of 135 OTC stocks on January 18, 1962,
showed that in fifty percent of the retail sales transactions the broker-
dealers purchased for customers as agents, in twenty-five percent they
purchased and resold as principal, and in twenty-five percent they sold
as principal from inventory.114 An NASD sampling of 246 stocks sold
on August 11, 1965, showed that in sixty-six percent of such transac-
tions the broker-dealers purchased for customers as agents, in twelve
111 Justice Dep't Memo 43.
112 Id. at 195, 196. The present Assistant Attorney General, Richard W. MacLaren,
has taken a similar position, stating that "[t]he question is whether rate fixing and related
practices are necessary ... to achieve a legitimate goal of the Exchange Act.... If they
are not necessary, then they are subject to the Sherman Act, just like any other agree-
ment in restraint of trade." BNA Sac. Ra. & L. RaEP. No. 5, at A-2 (July 2, 1969).
113 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15A(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(8) (1964).
114 OTC STUDY 15.
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percent they purchased and resold as principal, and in twenty-two
percent they sold as principal from inventory.115
A. Compensation for Acting as Customer's Agent
When a broker-dealer buys or sells a security for a customer as
agent, the NASD requires that
he shall not charge his customer more than a fair commission or
service charge, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances
including market conditions with respect to such security at the
time of the transaction, the expense of executing the order and the
value of any service he may have rendered by reason of his experi-
ence in and knowledge of such security and the market therefor. 116
The amount of the commission must be set forth on the confirmation
that the broker-dealer is required to send the customer on completion
of the transaction. 17
Although stock exchange commission rate schedules are inappli-
cable to OTC stock transactions, including transactions handled by
member firms, the Special Study found that approximately ninety-five
percent of the agency transactions in OTC stocks in its 1962 sample
were executed at the NYSE commission rate, and that non-member as
well as member firms tended to use the NYSE schedule in such trans-
actions.11 A study of agency transactions done for the NASD showed
that the average charge on a purchase or sale for a customer in Sep-
tember 1965 was 1.10 percent of the money involved in the transac-
tion." 9
B. Compensation for Dealing with Customer as Principal
In contrast to the situation where a broker-dealer acts as agent
for his customer, a broker-dealer who acts as a principal in the sale
of a security to his customer is not required to disclose on the con-
firmation anything other than the "net" price to be paid by the cus-
tomer for the security.120 Without information as to the cost of the
security to the dealer or the prices currently being quoted by dealers
115 Id. The reasons for the increase in agency transactions as against non-inventory
principal transactions are discussed in text accompanying notes 147-160 infra.
116 NASD Rules, art. III, § 4.
117 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(c)(1); rule 15cl-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl4
(1969).
118 SPEC AL STUDY, pt. 2, at 624, 625.
119 OTC Suny, 34.
120 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(c)(1); rule 15cl-5.
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making a market in the stock, the customer has no way of knowing
what he is being charged for the dealer's services.'21
1. Limitations on Mark-Ups
In 1942 the SEC published for comment a rule that would have
required dealers to disclose to their customers in principal transactions
the best current independent bid and asked prices for the security. The
NASD opposed this proposal, and surveyed its members to determine
their mark-up practices. It ascertained that forty-seven percent of the
transactions were made at mark-ups of three percent or less and
seventy-one percent were made at mark-ups of five percent or less.
122
In October 1943 the NASD distributed the results of the survey to its
members, noting that there might be circumstances in which a mark-up
of more than five percent would be justified, and that a mark-up of
five percent or even lower is not always justified, but the five percent
figure would serve as a guide to what constitutes a "fair spread or
profit" within the meaning of the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice.123
This "five percent policy" has been elaborated through interpreta-
tion over the years. The amount of the mark-up is to be computed by
reference to the "prevailing market price," of which the dealer's con-
temporaneous cost is the best indication in the absence of other bona
fide evidence.124 A mark-up pattern of five percent or even less may be
considered unfair or unreasonable under appropriate circumstances.
The fairness of mark-ups may not be justified on the basis of excessive
expenses, but should be determined by reference to all relevant factors,
including the type and price of the security and its availability in the
market, the amount of money involved in the transaction, the nature
of the dealer's business, the type of service and facilities provided to
customers, the dealer's general pattern of mark-ups, and the type and
extent of disclosure he makes to his customers. 25
A large number of disciplinary proceedings based wholly or partly
on excessive mark-ups have been brought against broker-dealers by
both the NASD and the SEC. Both the NASD and the SEC require
121 See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943).
122 NASD Rules, Interpretation of the Board of Governors following article III, § 4.
123 Id. In 1944, members of the NASD challenged the Board's authority to establish
the "5% policy" by interpretation of the Rules of Fair Practice and demanded that the
policy statement be considered a rule which must' be submitted to a membership vote.
The SEC held that the Board's action was "by no means an inflexible limitation on
spreads," and thus constituted an interpretation rather than a rule. NASD, Inc., 17 S.E.C.
459 (1944).
124 NASD Rules, Interpretation of the Board of Governors following article I, § 4.
125 Id.
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that retail sales and purchase prices be reasonably related to the "cur-
rent" or "prevailing" market price at the time of the challenged trans-
actions.126 Usually proceedings are initiated against brokers whose
mark-ups are consistently not reasonably related to current market
price. Objectionable patterns have consisted of as many as 563127 and
as few as fourteen 28 transactions, and mark-ups found unfair have
ranged from 5.4 percent 129 to 200 percent. 130 Although the decisions
generally refer to the NASD's "five percent policy," mark-ups between
five percent and ten percent may be justified in some instances. Mark-
ups above ten percent are generally considered unjustifiable. 131 In cases
that also involve other improper practices, a violation of the mark-up
rule may be found on the basis of fewer transactions and lower mark-
ups.
13 2
When the NASD has shown the existence of a pattern of mark-up
violations, the member has the burden of establishing "justifying cir-
cumstances" for his action.13 The following have been held not to be
"justifying circumstances": excessive expenses in making a sale; 3 risk
in maintaining a large inventory; 13 small total dollar amount of the
transaction; 136 reliance on NASD inspection and approval of books; 137
and mark-ups consistent with those customary in the vicinity.138 In
126 Thill Securities Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7342, at 6 (June
11, 1964).
127 J.A. Winston & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7334 (June 5, 1964).
128 Powell & McGowan, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7302 (April 24,
1964).
129 Id.
130 Linder, Bilotti & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7738 (Nov. 5,
1965).
131 Gateway Stock & Bond, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8003, at 4
(Dec. 8, 1966). The SEC has "repeatedly held that mark-ups of more than 10% are unfair
even in the sale of low priced securities and particularly where there are transactions of
substantial size." Costello, Russotto & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7729,
at 5 (Oct. 22, 1965).
132 Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743 (Nov.
12, 1965); Powell & McGowan, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7302 (April
24, 1964).
133 NASD Rules, Interpretation of the Board of Governors following article III, § 4.
134 Kenneth B. Stucker Investment Securities, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 7823 (Feb. 15, 1966).
136 General Investing Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7316 (May 15,
1964).
136 Amsbary, Allen & Morton, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7834
(March 7, 1966).
137 Midland Securities, Inc., 40 S.E.C. 333 (1960).
138 Amsbary, Allen & Morton, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7834
(March 7, 1966).
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many instances, the dealer claims his mark-up was justified because
the sale was of a low-priced security, relying on an NASD statement
that a "somewhat higher percentage may sometimes be justified" in
the case of a low-priced security; i.e., a security that sells for ten dollars
or less.1 39 It seems, however, that the "low price factor" alone will not
justify a consistent pattern of mark-ups at a level substantially above
five percent. 140
a. Determination of Prevailing Market Price. A retail dealer who
does not maintain a position in a particular security should, in the
absence of countervailing evidence, use his contemporaneous cost-
the price paid to other dealers to purchase the same security on the
same day-as his mark-up base.' 41
When a dealer who makes a wholesale market in a security sells
that security to a retail customer out of inventory, there is a question
whether the mark-up should be based on the dealer's contemporaneous
cost, normally his bid price, or the price at which the stock is then being
offered by dealers to one another. The Special Study found that most
integrated firms base their mark-up on the price at which they are then
offering the stock to other dealers142 and recommended that the obliga-
tions of an integrated broker-dealer in respect to his retail pricing be
"defined ... more clearly and positively."'143 The 1966 O TC Study144
computed gross income from retail OTC sales as "the difference be-
tween the then current interdealer asked price and the 'net' price con-
firmed to the customer.' 45
Recent cases indicate that an integrated dealer is required to use
his contemporaneous cost as a mark-up base when the security is not
actively-traded among dealers, that is, when no independent competi-
139 Handley Invest. Co. v. SEC, 354 F.2d 64, 65 (10th Cir. 1965) (quotes interpretation
of NASD Rules art. III, §§ 1, 4, which refer to securities worth less than $10); Samuel B.
Franklin & Co.,v. SEC, 290 F.2d 719, 725 (9th Cir. 1961) (court refers to the same quote);
Ross Securities Inc., 40 S.E.C. 1064, 1066 (1962).
140 See Handley Invest. Co. v. SEC, 354 F.2d 64 (10th Cir. 1965) (25%-57% mark-up
on 63/4-8V cent stocks held excessive); Managed Investment Programs, 37 S.E.C. 783 (1957)
(10%-21% mark-up on $2 and $3 stocks held excessive); Amsbary, Allen & Morton, Inc.,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7834 (March 7, 1966) (8.3%-1l% on 26 transac-
tions at prices from $5.75-$6.50 held excessive).
141 See Kenneth B. Stucker Investment Securities, SEC Securities Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 7823 (Feb. 15, 1966); Costello, Russotto & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 7729, at 2 (Oct. 22, 1965); J.A. Winston & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 7337 (June 8, 1964).
142 SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 649.
143 Id. at 677.
144 See note I supra.
145 OTC STUDY, Appendix C, form III.
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tive market exists. This is usually the case where the integrated firm is
the dominant factor in either the wholesale or retail market. When an
independent competitive retail and wholesale market does exist, the
integrated dealer may use the offering prices quoted by other dealers
to one another as the basis for his retail mark-ups. 146
2. Special Study Recommendations
Among the sixteen recommendations of the Special Study con-
cerning OTC markets, three recommendations relating to dealers'
charges for retail transactions were subjects of particular objection by
segments of the securities business.147
a. "Riskless" Transactions. The Special Study recommended that
"a broker-dealer who neither is a primary market maker nor has a
bona fide inventory position should be required (subject to defined
exceptions) to execute customers' orders on an agency basis."'148 This
proposal was designed to require disclosure of the amount of the retail
mark-up in the so-called "riskless transaction" whereby a broker-dealer,
after accepting a customer's order, purchases the stock from another
dealer as principal and resells at a mark-up to the customer.
In discussions with the SEC in 1964, the NASD argued that this
proposal would tend to force firms to execute OTC transactions at
commissions roughly equivalent to NYSE minimum commission rates,
thus putting an "economic squeeze" on its members and diverting their
merchandising efforts away from OTC stocks.149 The SEC has taken no
action to implement the recommendation. The 1966 OTC Study
showed, however, that the average mark-up on "riskless" principal
transactions declined from 2.93 percent in September 1963 to 2A0 per-
cent in September 1965, while, in comparison, average commissions
on agency transactions only declined from 1.13 percent to 1.10 percent
during the same period.8 0 Furthermore, between 1962 and 1965 the
proportion of retail OTC sales accounted for by "riskless" principal
transactions declined from about twenty-five percent to about twelve
percent, while the proportion accounted for by agency transactions in-
146 Langley-Howard, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8361 (July 21,
1968); Century Securities Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8123 (July 14,
1967); Gateway Stock & Bond, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8003 (Dec. 8,
1966); Strathmore Securities, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7864 (April
18, 1966); Shearson, Hammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743 (Nov.
12, 1965).
147 OTC STUDY 1.
148 SPEcIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 676.
149 OTC STUDY 2.
150 Id. at 34.
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creased from about fifty percent to sixty-six percent.151 These changes
are attributable in part to the improvements in disclosure discussed
below.152
b. Disclosure. The Special Study recommended changes in the
manner in which "retail" quotations were furnished either by or under
the supervision of the NASD for publication in newspapers. 158 While
the bid prices published at that time generally represented the inter-
dealer bids, the retail asked prices were generally determined by adding
to the inter-dealer asked prices a percentage mark-up ranging from
about five percent on stocks selling below twenty-five dollars to about
two percent on stocks selling above $135.154 The Special Study con-
cluded that this system must be "confusing if not deceptive to many
investors' 155 since an investor "may get the impression or actually be
told that his security was bought commission free, below the 'high.' "156
It recommended that the newspaper quotations be revised "to show
generally ... the best prevailing interdealer bid and asked quotations
that can be reasonably ascertained."'157
In 1964 the NASD, with the concurrence of the SEC, adopted
a plan providing for newspaper publication of representative inter-
dealer bid and asked prices for the approximately 1,300 actively traded
stocks of larger companies that appear on the "national list." This
system was inaugurated "on a test basis" in February 1965, and has
been in effect since that time. In 1966 it was extended to the less
actively traded securities of smaller companies appearing on the so-
called "local lists.188
A third controversial recommendation by the Special Study was
that a broker-dealer selling as principal be required to state in the
confirmation the inter-dealer price available at the time of the transac-
tion, thereby showing the customer the approximate amount of the
mark-up.' 59 The NASD strongly opposed this recommendation on
economic grounds,160 and it has not been implemented.
151 Id. at 15.
152 Id.
153 SPECILm STUDY, pt. 2, at 677.
154 Id. at 634.
155 Id. at 667.
156 Id. at 644 (footnote omitted).
157 Id. at 677.
158 NASD, 1966 ANN. REP. 4.
159 SPCaIAL STUDY, pt. 2, at 677, 678.
160 OTC STUDY 2.
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IV
SALE OF MUTUAL FUND SHARES
A. Method of Fixing Sales Loads
In contrast to stock exchange transactions, for which uniform min-
imum commissions are established by the various exchanges, and to
OTC transactions, to which no minimum commissions or mark-ups are
applicable, the compensation payable to a dealer for selling shares of
a mutual fund is fixed by the sponsor of each fund and is binding on
all dealers who sell shares of that fund.
Under section 22(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, no
dealer may sell shares of a mutual fund to a public customer "except
at a current public offering price described in the prospectus." This
restriction is applicable regardless of whether the dealer acquired the
shares from the fund itself or from a shareholder of the fund.161 The
fund prospectus normally sets forth the public offering price of fund
shares in terms of the net asset value of the fund on a per-share basis
plus a sales load, which is a specified percentage of the public offering
price.162 For example, if a mutual fund prospectus specifies a sales load
of 8.5 percent of the public offering price, and the current net asset
value of the fund works out to $9.15 per share, a customer who buys
one hundred shares of 'he fund will pay $1,000, of which $85 (8.5 per-
cent of the public offering price) is divided between the dealer and the
principal underwriter and $915 is paid over to the fund to purchase
the one hundred shares.
B. Level of Sales Loads
In its 1966 Mutual Fund Report, the SEC found that the pre-
vailing level of sales loads was 8.5 percent of the public offering price. 63
161 This restriction was a factor in the virtual elimination of secondary trading in
mutual fund shares.
162 Rule 22c-1, which became effective January 13, 1969, provides that the price at
which mutual fund shares are sold must be based on the first net asset value computed
after the order is received by the dealer. This procedure is known as "forward pricing."
The net asset value must be recomputed at least once a day. Prior to January 13, 1969,
many funds sold shares on the basis of the last net asset value computed before a specified
cut-off time which preceded the receipt of the order. Rule 22c-1: proposed, SEC Invest-
ment Company Act Release No. 5413 (June 25, 1968); adopted, SEC Investment Company
Act Release No. 5519 (Oct. 16, 1968); interpreted, SEC Investment Company Act Release
No. 5569 (Dec. 27, 1968).
163 SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROwTH, published as
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Of the 195 load funds listed in one compilation, none charged more
than nine percent, 102 charged exactly 8.5 percent, and only eight
charged less than 7.5 percent. 1 4 The Commission also found that com-
petitive pressures had resulted in an increase in sales loads over the
years, since funds compete for the favor of dealers by offering higher
compensation rather than for the favor of customers by offering lower
sales costs.165 A survey of thirty leading load funds indicated that the
median sales load had increased from 7.5 percent in 1950 to 8.5 per-
cent in 1966.166There is no general statutory limit on mutual fund sales charges.
Section 27(a)(1) of the Investment Company Act, however, limits the
sales load on periodic payment plans to nine percent, 167 and there have
been some indications that the SEC might take the view that a sales
load in excess of nine percent on shares of any mutual fund is "un-
conscionable or grossly excessive."'' 18
Section 22(b) of the Investment Company Act authorizes the
NASD to adopt rules limiting the discount from the public offering
price at which its members may purchase mutual fund shares "in order
that the price at which such security is offered or sold to the public
shall not include an unconscionable or grossly excessive sales load."'' 69
Pursuant to this provision, the NASD has adopted a rule prohibiting
any member from participating in the offering or sale of mutual fund
shares for which they act as underwriter, if the offering price includes
a sales load "which is unfair, taking into consideration all relevant
circumstances, including the current marketability of such security and
all expenses involved.' 170
However, the NASD has specifically made its "five percent policy"
on mark-ups for OTC securities inapplicable to the distribution of
mutual fund shares on the ground that such transactions are "under-
writing" activities. 171 This rationale is questionable; distribution of
mutual fund shares is technically an "underwriting" activity in the
sense of a public offering of newly issued securities, but it is com-
H.R. RaP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Mu'ruAL FuND
REPORT].
164 Id. at 204.
165 Id. at 208.
166 Id.
167 See text accompanying notes 193-94 infra.
168 Hearings on H.R. 9510 & 9511 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 722 (1967).
169 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(b) (1964).
170 NASD Rules, art. III, § 26(d).
171 NASD Rules, Interpretation of the Board of Governors following article UI, § 4.
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pletely "riskless" since NASD rules prohibit members from purchasing
any shares of a mutual fund except for the purpose of filling an order
already received from a customer. 7 2
In its 1966 Mutual Fund Report, the SEC recommended that the
Investment Company Act be amended to provide that sales charges for
mutual fund shares be limited to five percent of the net asset value
(equivalent to 4.76 percent of the public offering price). 7 3 This pro-
posal was strongly opposed by the industry, and the Senate Banking
and Currency Committee rejected it during the 1967 hearings on
mutual fund legislation. The Committee instead recommended an
amendment of section 22(b) to authorize the NASD (or any other
securities association registered under section 15A of the Exchange
Act) to prohibit its members from offering mutual fund shares at a
price that includes an "excessive" sales load. 7 4 This provision was
carried over into the 1969 Senate bill. 7 5 In formulating rules as to
excessive sales loads, the association would be required by the bill to
"allow for reasonable compensation for sales personnel, broker-dealers,
and underwriters, and for reasonable sales loads to investors."' 76
Eighteen months after enactment of the proposed amendments,
the SEC would be authorized to alter or supplement the rules of the
association as necessary to effectuate the purpose of the amendments. 77
This authority would be exercised in the manner prescribed in section
15A(k)(2) of the Exchange Act, under which the SEC must first request
the association to alter or supplement its rules in a specified manner.
If such action is not taken within a reasonable time, the SEC itself,
after appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing, may order the
rules of the association to be altered or supplemented as necessary to
effectuate the statutory objectives.1 8
The SEC would also be authorized, after eighteen months, to
adopt rules effectuating the purpose of the amendments by regulating
sales by broker-dealers who are not members of a registered securities
172 NASD Rules, art. III, § 26(t)(2).
173 MuruA FuND REPORT 223.
174 S. REP. No. 1351, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 15 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Senate
Report]. At present such an association can prohibit only sales at prices that include
"unconscionable or grossly excessive" sales loads. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 22(b),
15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(b) (1964).
175 S. 2224, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12 (1969). The Subcommittee on Commerce and
Finance of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce held hearings on the
Senate bill in late 1969. This provision of the bill is not opposed by the industry.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Cf. note 74 supra and accompanying text.
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association. 179 However, a non-member broker-dealer would not be
subject to regulation if the underwriter of the mutual fund shares
which he is selling filed a notice of election to comply with the rules of
the association in distributing the shares of such fund.180
C. Quantity Discounts
The public offering price set forth in a mutual fund prospectus
customarily provides for progressively lower sales loads on larger pur-
chases. The first breakpoint is usually between $10,000 and $25,000;
above it the sales load is about one percent lower. There are usually
further step-downs leading ultimately to a load of about one percent on
sales exceeding $1,000,000.181 Many funds permit a series of purchases,
or purchases of shares of different funds distributed by the same prin-
cipal underwriter, to be cumulated for purposes of entitling the pur-
chaser to the lower sales load. 82
In 1941 the SEC's General Counsel gave an opinion that the
quantity discount practice did not violate section 22(d), which requires
that mutual fund shares be sold at "a current public offering price
described in the prospectus," if the quantity discounts were clearly
described in the prospectus and available to any member of the public
on a nondiscriminatory basis. 83 In 1958 the SEC codified this opinion
in rule 22d-1,184 which provides an exemption from section 22(d) to the
extent necessary to permit sales at reduced sales loads "in accordance
with a scale of reducing sales load varying with the quantity of securi-
ties purchased by any person." The rule provides that the reduced
sales load may be applied to the purchase of shares of several funds
distributed by the same principal underwriter. The reduction may be
applied on the basis of the amount involved in (1) a single purchase,
(2) a single purchase plus amounts previously purchased, or (3) a series
of purchases over a period of not less than thirteen months pursuarit
to a "statement of intention" containing certain specified provisions.
In a recent case based on the contention that mutual fund quantity
179 Several large mutual fund underwriters distribute their shares through "captive"
sales organizations which are not members of the NASD.
180 S. 2224, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 12 (1969).
181 MUTUAL FUND REPORT 210. Inducing a customer to purchase an amount of
shares just below an amount that would entitle him to a lower sales load has been held
by the NASD to be contrary to just and equitable principles of trade. NASD MANUAL,
Interpretation of Board of Governors 5266. See Mason, Moran & Co., 35 S.E.C. 84 (1953);
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743, at 34 (Nov. 12, 1965); Russell L. Irish In-
vestments, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7687, at 7 (Aug. 27, 1965).
182 MUTUAL FUND REPORT 206, 207.
183 Opinion of General Counsel, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 89
(March 13, 1941); 2 P-H SEC. REG. 26,324.1, at 25,656.
184 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 2798, at 47 (Dec. 2, 1958).
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discounts violate the price discrimination provisions of the Robinson-
Patman Act, 8s the court concluded that
[T]he Act was enacted to protect only persons in a competitive rela-
tionship with one another, and personal investors do not occupy
that status. The alleged "price discrimination" would be immune
from attack.. because cumulative quantity discounts are impliedly
exempted from the Robinson-Patman Act by virtue of the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 and the rules and regulations of the
SEC enacted pursuant to it.186
1. Group Sales
Prior to 1958, the SEC allowed medical and dental associations
and other groups to pool payments by their members and to purchase
mutual fund shares at the lower sales loads applicable to large pur-
chases. 8 7 In 1958, in response to "industry complaints" that the prac-
tice of group sales threatened the industry's "orderly distribution
system,"' 188 the SEC provided in rule 22d-1 that quantity discounts
should not be available to "a group of individuals whose funds are
combined, directly or indirectly, for the purchase [of fund shares or]
a trustee, agent, custodian, or other representative of such a group."'89
The SEC justified its position on the ground that group sales are in-
consistent with the policy against "discriminatory pricing policies"
found in section 22(d), even though in rule 22d-1 it specifically sanc-
tioned discounts for large purchases by single individuals for their own
account and sales at a reduced load or no load to officers, directors,
partners, and employees of the funds.190
In October 1968 the SEC announced that it was considering
amending rule 22d-1 to delete the clause prohibiting quantity discounts
for group purchases. It stated that, as a result of its studies of the
mutual fund industry, it "now believes that no disruption of the or-
185 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
188 Baum v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 914, 921 (N.D. IM. 1968).
187 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 2798, at 46 (Dec. 2, 1958).
188 Id. at 45.
189 This was done by adopting a special definition of "person" for the purpose of
rule 22d-1. "Person," as defined by §§ 2(a)(27) and 2(a)(8) of the Investment Company Act
includes "any organized group of persons whether incorporated or not." In 1960 the SEC
also ruled that groups which had been taking advantage of the quantity discount prior
to the SEC's change of heart could not continue to do so on future purchases. SEC Invest-
ment Company Act Release No. 3015 (April 15, 1960).
190 See In re Travelers Equities Fund, Inc., BNA SEC. RFG. & LAw REP. No. 19, at A-5
(Oct. 8, 1969) in which the NASD opposed a proposal by Travelers to offer shares without
any sales load to employees of all Travelers companies as well as to contract sales repre-
sentatives and their employees. Travelers subsequently limited its requested exemption and
the NASD withdrew its opposition. See BNA SEC. REG. & LAw REt'. No. 23, at A-15 (Nov.
5,1969).
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derly, effective distribution system of mutual funds shares would de-
velop if mutual funds and their distributors were allowed, on a strictly
voluntary basis, to afford quantity discounts to groups of individuals
. . . on a uniform, nondiscriminatory basis."'191 Industry spokesmen
have opposed the amendment,192 and the SEC has as yet taken no further
action.
D. Periodic Payment Plans
Special provisions are applicable to periodic payment plans (also
known as "contractual plans" or "front-end load plans"). Under these
plans, mutual fund shares are purchased by payment of monthly or
other periodic fixed installments over a period of years. A distinctive
feature of the plans is that, while the payments are generally spread
over a period of ten years or more, a large part of the sales load on
the total plan is deducted from the payments made during the first year.
Under section 27(a) of the Investment Company Act, the total
sales load on the completed plan may not exceed nine percent of the
total payments made by the purchaser, but up to one-half of each of
the first twelve monthly payments may be deducted for sales load.193
For example, a plan calling for payment of $12,000 in 120 monthly
installments of $100 each can provide for a total sales load of $1,080,
obtained by deducting $50 from each of the first twelve payments and
$4.44 from each of the remaining 108 payments.19 4
In its 1966 Mutual Fund Report, the SEC recommended that
front-end loads in the sale of mutual fund shares be prohibited and
that the sales load be required to be uniform on all installments.195
This recommendation was based on the finding that the substantial
proportion of investors who signed up for these plans and who were
unable or unwilling to continue making payments were penalized by
sales charges that could run as high as fifty percent of the amount they
had invested. 96
191 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5507, at 2 (Oct. 7, 1968).
192 See Simpson & Hodes, The Continuing Controversy Surrounding the Uniform Price
Maintenance Provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 44 NoTRE DAME LAW.
718, 724 (1969). While a majority of the comments opposed any discounts on group sales,
a number of commentators indicated that they would approve the proposal if it could be
limited to bona fide groups formed for unrelated purposes, and if other procedural prob-
lems could be resolved.
193 MUTUAL FUND REPORT 230.
194 The sale of periodic payment plans featuring a front-end load is prohibited or
sharply limited in California, Illinois, and Wisconsin. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10,
§ 260.140.80; ILL. SEC. L. REGs., rule c-9; Wisc. ADM. CODE, SEC 2.03.
195 MuTuAL FUND REPORT 247.
196 Id. at 22, 237.
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The prohibition of front-end load plans was vigorously opposed
by the Association of Mutual Fund Plan Sponsors, a trade association. 19 7
The mutual fund bill passed by the Senate in 1968 substituted a pro-
vision that preserved the nine percent sales load limit for the entire
plan but provided that not more than twenty percent of any payment
could be deducted for sales load. The bill also limited the average
deduction for sales load on the first forty-eight monthly payments to
sixteen percent. 98 The purpose of this provision was to permit the
dealer to receive as much compensation on the first forty-eight monthly
installments as he can receive under the present law, but to spread
that compensation more evenly over the forty-eight-month period so
that, no matter how early an investor dropped out of the plan, he could
not be penalized by an effective sales load of greater than twenty per-
cent.
The 1968 Senate bill also provided that when, in any month, an
investor paid more than the minimum monthly payment called for by
the plan, the sales load on the excess would be at the lower rate ap-
plicable to payments made after the first forty-eight monthly pay-
ments.199 This provision was designed to deal with the situation in
which, for example, a customer buying a fifty-dollar-a-month plan is
induced to start with a lump-sum payment of $600-equivalent to the
entire first year's payments-on which the sales load would currently
be $300. The Senate committee felt that the practice of charging the
higher load on lump-sum payments is "totally inconsistent with the
industry's justification of the front-end load-that it is necessary to
provide adequate compensation for the sale of mutual fund shares to
people who are only able to invest small amounts of money at a given
time."200
The bill passed by the Senate in 1969 retains the pattern of limita-
tions found in the 1968 bill, but applies them only to plan sponsors
who elect to be governed by them.201 Non-electing plan sponsors would
continue to be governed by the present limitations of section 27(a),
subject to the proviso that if any investor redeemed his plan within
three years from the time of his first payment, he would be entitled to
receive (1) the value of his account under the plan, which would reflect
any gain or loss in the net asset value of the underlying fund shares,
plus (2) the amount by which the aggregate sales load he had paid
107 Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking & Currency, 90th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 372 (1967).
198 S. 3724, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 16 (1968). See also 1968 Senate Report 16.
199 S. 3724, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 16 (1968).
200 1968 Senate Report 17.
201 S. 2224, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 17(® (1969).
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exceeded fifteen percent of his total payments made under the plan.202
The plan sponsor would be required to notify any investor who had
missed three payments or more during the first three years of the plan
of his right to redeem and the amounts to which he would be entitled
under this provision.20 3
The 1969 bill also provides that, within sixty days after any person
invests in a plan, he must be sent a notice setting forth the charges to
be deducted from his payments under the plan and notifying him that
he has a right to withdraw from the plan within sixty days of the
mailing of the notice and to receive (1) the value of his account, plus
(2) the sales loads, custodian fees, and other expenses with which he
has been charged.20 4 While the Senate Committee Report is unclear
on the point,205 it appears that this right of withdrawal applies whether
the plan sponsor elects to be governed by the limitation on sales loads
or remains subject to present regulations with the new provision for
a partial refund of sales load during the first three years of the plan.
E. Additional Compensation for Sale of Mutual Fund Shares
Although the portion of the sales load received by a broker-dealer
is his basic compensation for the sale of mutual fund shares, there exist
various means by which he can obtain additional compensation.
1. Portfolio Brokerage-Reciprocity
Trading by mutual funds in portfolio securities, mostly listed
stocks, generates a great deal of commissions. The rapid growth of
mutual funds in recent years, combined with an accelerated rate of
portfolio turnover, has increased the importance of this source of com-
pensation.
It has been the practice of mutual fund managers to direct the
commissions from fund portfolio transactions to broker-dealers who
sell shares of the fund or provide "research" or other services to the
fund.2 0 6 Prior to December 5, 1968, this could be accomplished by
directing the brokers to whom they gave the funds' orders for execu-
tion to "give up" portions of the fixed minimum commissions to the
other broker-dealers whom the fund managers wished to reward. On
that date the national securities exchanges prohibited these "customer-
directed give-ups.'
20 7
202 Id. § 16(c).
203 Id. § 16(d).
204 Id. § 16(e).
205 S. REP. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1969).
208 MUTUAL FUND REPORT 169.
207 See text accompanying notes 45-54 supra.
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This prohibition, of course, does not prevent fund managers from
giving portfolio business directly to broker-dealers whom they wish
to reward. This practice, however, is much more cumbersome than
the "give-up." Furthermore, it may expose the fund manager to li-
ability if he gives a portfolio order to a broker-dealer who, he has
reason to believe, is not likely to be able to execute the transaction at
the price most favorable to the fund.208 Aside from this fiduciary
liability, a fund manager is potentially liable under the antitrust laws
if he follows a regular practice of giving "reciprocal" portfolio com-
mission business to particular broker-dealers for reasons unrelated to
their ability to obtain the best execution for the fund.20 9 A broker-
dealer may be similarly liable if he refuses to sell fund shares unless
he gets reciprocal business. A number of consent judgments directed
against reciprocal business practices of this nature have recently been
obtained by the Justice Department under section 1 of the Sherman
Act,210 and the Silver and Kaplan cases211 give no reason to think that
any implied exemption from the antitrust laws applicable to exchange
fixing of minimum commission rates also insulates reciprocal arrange-
ments from antitrust liability.2
12
2. "Special Deals"
Outside the reciprocal brokerage area, the NASD considers it
inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade for a mutual
fund underwriter, in connection with the sale of mutual fund shares,
to give an NASD member "anything of material value in addition to
the discounts or concessions set forth in the currently effective pro-
spectus [of the mutual fund]. 2 13 This interpretation has been construed
to apply to gifts of more than twenty-five dollars in value, loans and
guarantees, sales of securities on a preferential basis, extra discounts,
wholesale overrides, and travel expenses unrelated to attendance at
bona fide business meetings related to the fund, but not to apply to oc-
208 See Hubshman Management Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8557
(March 20, 1969).
209 See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 28 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
The court found that systematic reciprocal trading arrangements, whether coercive or
based on mutual patronage, were anti-competitive practices and violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
210 Wall St. J., June 20, 1969, at 40, col. 1.
211 Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 873 U.S. 341 (1968); Kaplan v. Lehman Bros.,
250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. I1. 1966), aff'd, 871 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S, 954
(1967).
212 See text accompanying notes 90-112 supra.
213 NASD MANUAL, Interpretation of the Board of Gevernors 5262.
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casional dinners or entertainment or to items of "reminder advertising"
such as ballpoint pens and calendar pads.214
The NASD also considers it improper for a member to compensate
its salesmen for selling mutual fund shares in a manner that does not
"bear a reasonable relationship to the dealer discount set forth in
the prospectus." 215
3. Sales Load on Reinvestment of Dividends
In its Mutual Fund Report, the SEC found that more than half
of the mutual fund shareholder accounts in existence in 1965 provided
for automatic reinvestment of capital gains and dividend distributions.
Although no fund charges a sales load on reinvestment of capital gains,
almost half the funds at that time charged a full sales load on the
reinvestment of income dividends.216 A substantial part of this sales
load is paid over by the underwriter to the dealer who originally sold
the shares or, if he is no longer in business, to some other dealer. The
SEC recommended that it be given authority to prohibit this "anom-
alous practice," on the ground that the reinvestment of dividends
involves no sales effort justifying the imposition of a sales load.217
Rather than giving the SEC the special authority it sought, the Senate
committee left the matter to be dealt with under the general powers
to regulate "excessive" sales loads granted to the NASD and the SEC
by the Senate bill. The committee felt that the standards set forth in
those provisions would "permit flexible treatment of the problem of
sales loads on automatic investment of dividends, which involve little
or no new selling effort."2 18
V
UNDERWRITING
A. Fixed Public Offering Price
In the typical firm-commitment underwriting, the underwriters
purchase stock from the issuer or selling stockholder and resell it
either directly to the public or to "selected dealers" for resale to the
public. The agreements among the underwriters and between the
214 Id.
215 Id. 5263.
216 MUTUAL FuN REORT 215.
217 Id. at 223.
218 1968 Senate Report 16.
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underwriters and the "selected dealers" require that all sales to the
public be made at the public offering price fixed by the underwriters,
which provides for a profit, or "spread," above the price which the
underwriters have agreed to pay the issuer or selling stockholder. 219
No express statutory provision exempts these resale price main-
tenance agreements from the antitrust laws. The SEC held in 1945,
however, that "[t]he mere making of agreements containing provisions
for a fixed offering price.., is not per se unlawful" under the Sherman
Act, although, "like many other contracts, these may be entered into
and performed under circumstances that amount to an unlawful sup-
pression of competition." 220 But the SEC also held that the NASD has
no authority to discipline a member who violates a price maintenance
agreement. 221 The Commission felt that any rule or interpretation by
the NASD requiring adherence to price maintenance agreements would
be contrary to the provisions of section 15A(b)(8) of the Exchange Act,
under which the rules of a national securities association may not be
designed "to fix minimum profits.., or... minimum rates of com-
missions, allowances, discounts or other charges."
Agreements among underwriters and with "selected dealers" also
customarily provide that a discount from the public offering price
may be allowed to any NASD member. Under the NASD's Rules of
Fair Practice, a member is prohibited from dealing with non-member
brokers or dealers except at the same prices as such member accords to
the general public,2 22 and this rule is interpreted to bar members from
participating in any underwriting syndicate or selling group that in-
cludes non-members.2 23 This restriction against non-member participa-
tion in underwriting is a principal incentive for a broker-dealer to join
the NASD.
B. Level of Underwriting Compensation
1. Statutory Restrictions
The federal securities laws impose no direct restrictions on the
amount of compensation that may be paid to underwriters and dealers
in connection with a public offering, but full disclosure of all under-
219 United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
220 National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 19 S.E.C. 424, 464 (1945). Judge
Medina expressed his "complete agreement" with this position in United States v. Morgan,
118 F. Supp. 621, 699 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), an antitrust action against 16 leading underwriters.
221 National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 19 S.E.C. 424, 445 (1945).
222 NASD Rules art. III, § 25.
223 NASD Rules, Interpretation of the Board of Governors following article III, § 24.
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writing compensation is required in public offerings that are subject
to the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.224
By way of statute or regulation, a number of states impose de-
tailed restrictions on the amount of underwriting compensation that
may be paid on issues qualified for sale in those states,225 and other
states give discretionary power to administrative officials to deny
registration of an issue if "unreasonable" underwriting compensation
will be paid.226
2. NASD Supervision
The NASD "five percent mark-up policy" is not applied to fixed-
price underwritten offerings.227 Since 1961, however, the NASD has
interpreted its Rules of Fair Practice as prohibiting members from
participating in underwritings "in which the underwriting arrange-
ments as a whole are unfair or unreasonable. ' 228 In determining fair-
ness or reasonableness, the NASD takes into account the size of the
underwriting, whether it is being sold on a firm commitment or best
efforts basis, the type of security, the nature and amount of compensa-
tion, and other relevant factors. In determining the amount of com-
pensation, the NASD considers the gross amount of the underwriters'
discount, any expenses borne by the issuer or selling stockholder that
would normally be borne by the underwriters, and any stock or options
acquired by the underwriters or related parties. The arrangements are
normally considered unfair or unreasonable per se if the underwriters
or related parties receive stock, options or warrants that are transferable
within a period of one year from the date of the offering.229
To implement these restrictions, the NASD currently requires
any member acting as managing underwriter of a registered or intra-
state public offering to file with it, prior to the offering, copies of the
224 Securities Act of 1933, schedule A, item 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1964).
225 Selling commissions are limited to 15% of the offering price in a number of states.
See, e.g., CALIF. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 260.140.20; IND. SEC. COMm. REG., rule 19.02; MICH.
DEP'T OF Cofmm., SEc. RuLFs, pt. 8, rule 706.5; MINN. REs. S. Div. 20; OHIO DIv. OF SEC.
reg. CO-105(A).
226 The Uniform Securities Act contains a provision permitting the administrator to
suspend or revoke a registration statement if the offering "has been or would be made
with unreasonable amounts of underwriters' and sellers' discounts, commissions, or other
compensation .... ." UNIFORM SEC. ACT § 306(F). This provision has been adopted
in Alabama, Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto
Rico, Washington, and Wyoming.
227 NASD Rules, Interpretation of the Board of Governors following article III, § 4.
228 NASD Rules, Interpretation of the Board of Governors following article III, § 1.
229 Id. See also state restrictions discussed in PLI's Conference on "Going Public," 2
REv. OF SEC. RFGS. 846 (1969).
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offering prospectus and other documents describing the underwriting
arrangements. These are reviewed by the NASD's Committee on Under-
writing Arrangements. 230 A detailed set of guidelines for underwriters'
compensation is reported to have been approved by the NASD Com-
mittee on Underwriting Arrangements and commented on by the
SEC, and is expected to be issued early in 1970.231 The number of
issues reviewed by the committee increased from 428 in 1966 to 1,074
in 1967 to 2,108 in 1968. The underwriting arrangements in 328 issues
were initially found "unfair or unreasonable" in 1968 as against seven-
teen in the previous year.232 In almost all of these cases, the arrange-
ments were modified to meet the committee's objections.23
VI
INTEREST INCOME
Interest charged on customers' margin accounts constitutes a
substantial part of the income of broker-dealers, particularly that of the
larger NYSE member firms. The income and expense reports filed by
NYSE members doing public commission business in 1960 showed that
thirteen percent of their gross income came from interest received
from customers' balances. 23 4
A. Disclosure of Interest Rate
The Special Study found that "normally money is lent to margin
customers at the going call-money rate plus one* or one-half point."3 5
Margin loans by registered broker-dealers were specifically exempted
from the 1968 federal Consumer Credit Protection Act 230 on the ground
that the SEC already had authority under the Exchange Act to require
appropriate disclosure. 23 7
In December 1969 the SEC adopted a new rule lOb-16. It re-
quires broker-dealers who extend credit to their customers to provide
the customers with (1) an initial statement disclosing the basis on which
interest will be charged, the initial interest rate, the conditions under
which it may be changed, and any additional charges or liens; and
230 NASD Rules, Interpretation of the Board of Governors following article III, § 1.
231 3 REv. OF SEC. REGS. 999 (1970).
232 NASD, 1968 REPORT TO fEmBERS 6, 7.
233 Id.
234 SPECIAL STuDY, pt. 2, at 39.
285 SPEcIAL STuDY, pt. 1, at 596.
236 15 U.S.C. § 1605(2) (Supp. IV, 1969).
237 S. REP. No. 392, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1967).
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(2) a quarterly statement disclosing the interest charged and the manner
in which it was computed.s
B. Use of Customers' Free Credit Balances
The Special Study found that free credit balances in customers'
accounts are an important source of financing for broker-dealers, par-
ticularly exchange members. Although a few states require segregation
of customers' credit balances from firm assets, balances are generally
available for firm operations, including the financing of loans to margin
customers.
239
Under SEC rule 15c3-2, adopted in 1964, a broker-dealer must, at
least quarterly, send to each customer whose free credit balance may be
used for the firm's business purposes a notice informing him of this
fact and that the funds are payable to the customer on demand.2 40
The Special Study also found that most firms pay no interest to
customers on these balances, and that those that do pay interest do so
only on large balances that are reinvested within a short period of
time. Frequently, interest is paid only when the customer requests it.241
There is no rule requiring payment of interest on these balances; in
fact, the NYSE prohibits its members from paying interest "on any
credit balance created for the purpose of receiving interest thereon"2 42
on the ground that to do so would violate section 21 of the Banking
Act of 1933, which bars broker-dealers from engaging in the business
of "receiving deposits. ' 243 To implement this policy, the NYSE "has
informally promulgated the view that interest can be paid on free
credit balances only at a half point or more below the going call-money
rate. '244 The SEC's rule 15c3-2 does not adopt the recommendation
of the Special Study that notice to customers disclose "that interest
is not paid on such balances (or the circumstances in which interest
is paid).1 245
238 Proposed, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8594 (May 2, 1969); adopted,
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8773 (Dec. 8, 1969).
239 SPECIAL. STUDY, pt. 1, at 399.
240 Proposed, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7266 (March 12, 1964);
adopted, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7325 (May 27, 1964).
241 SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 1, at 395.
242 NYSE rule 436.
243 12 U.S.C. § 378 (Supp. IV, 1969).
244 SPECIAL STUDY, pt. 1, at 395.
245 Id. at 415. The SEC stated that "this information is not directly pertinent to the
purpose of the rule; i.e., to put customers on notice that free credit balances left with
the broker-dealer may be used in the business and therefore may be at risk." SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 7325 (May 27, 1964).
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CONCLUSION
There is no consistent or coherent pattern of regulation governing
the charges which firms in the securities business levy on their cus-
tomers. Price competition is drastically limited by a complex of restric-
tive rules and arrangements, but no comprehensive rational substitute
for free competition has been developed. The pattern of regulation
reflects historical developments and the interplay of political forces
within and without the securities business. Recent changes in the
nature of the market for equity securities, together with technological
changes in the way the securities business is conducted, have empha-
sized the weaknesses of the current structure and will, hopefully, lead
to the development of more satisfactory alternatives.
